Fatal Moments: Byford Dolphin Accident Footage Exposed. The Byford Dolphin incident is one of the most horrific accidents in recent history. Four divers present in the decompression chamber on that fateful day couldn’t even comprehend what had happened and perished in less than a second. It was a brutal and agonizing death, marking one of the darkest chapters in diving history. Details of the Accident at wisescapelearning.com
I. Origin of Byford Dolphin Accident Footage
The Byford Dolphin drilling rig is currently situated in the North Sea. The rig has faced several serious accidents throughout its operation, including the 1983 explosive decompression Byford Dolphin Accident Footage that claimed the lives of 5 workers and severely injured another. The sudden change in pressure caused by opening, closing, and re-opening can lead to immediate explosive decompression, resulting in severe injuries and potential death for those in close proximity. Furthermore, it generates a slightly less severe but still significant pressure drop in any enclosed space with it. Both chambers and rooms experience pressure upon closure and intense pressure release upon opening.
Byford Dolphin is a semi-submersible drilling rig stabilized by columns operated by Dolphin Drilling, a subsidiary of Fred Olsen Energy. It conducts seasonal drilling for various companies in areas belonging to the UK, Denmark, and Norway in the North Sea. It was registered in Hamilton, Bermuda. In 2019, there were discussions about decommissioning the rig.
II. Description
Originally constructed as a Deep Sea Drilling Vessel, it was the first in the highly successful Aker H-3 series designed by the Aker Group and completed at the Aker Verdal shipyard in 1974.
Byford Dolphin has a total length of 108.2 meters (355 ft), a width of 67.4 meters (221 ft), and a depth of 36.6 meters (120 ft). It has a maximum drilling depth of 6,100 meters (20,000 ft) and can operate at a water depth of 460 meters (1,500 ft). Equipped with advanced drilling equipment, Byford Dolphin initially met stringent certification levels under Norwegian law, although it was later banned from operating in Norwegian waters. It can move using its own engines to counter drift and ocean currents, but for long-distance movements, it needs to be towed by specialized tugboats.
Technical Specifications of Byford Dolphin
- Operating Deck Load: 3,025 tons
- Crew Accommodation: 102 people
- Operating Water Depth: Maximum 460 meters (1,500 ft)
- Derrick: Shaffer 49m (160 ft) Telescopic Mast
- Mooring System: 12 points
- Blowout Preventer: Hydril 476 mm (18.7 in), 10,000 kPa (1,500 psi)
- Subsea Processing System: Christmas Tree
- Floor Cranes: 2 × 40 tons
III. Byford Dolphin Accident Footage
Deep Sea Drilling Rig Accident
On March 1, 1976, the rig ran aground while being moved from one location in the North Sea to Bergen. All crew members were evacuated, but six people lost their lives by falling off the vessel.
Diving Bell Accident
On Saturday, November 5, 1983, at 4:00 am, while drilling at the Frigg gas field in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea, four divers were inside the diving bell system on the rig’s deck connected to each other by a short trunk (a short passageway) to a diving bell. The divers were Edwin Arthur Coward (British, 35 years old), Roy P. Lucas (British, 38 years old), Bjørn Giæver Bergersen (Norwegian, 29 years old), and Truls Hellevik (Norwegian, 34 years old). They were assisted by two dive tenders, William Crammond (British, 32 years old), and Martin Saunders.
At the time of the Byford Dolphin Accident Footage, decompression chambers 1 and 2 (along with the unused third chamber) were connected via a trunk to the diving bell. The trunk’s connection was tightly sealed by a clamp operated by experienced divers Crammond and Saunders. Coward and Lucas were resting in chamber 2 at a pressure of 9 atm. Bergersen and Hellevik’s diving bell had just been hoisted up after a dive and secured to the hatch. Leaving their wet equipment in the hatch, the two divers climbed through the hatch into chamber 1.
The normal procedure would be:
- Close the diving bell, which should be opened for the hatch.
- Slightly increase the pressure in the diving bell to seal the diving bell door.
- Close chamber 1, also the hatch leading to the diving bell.
- Decompress from inside the tank until reaching 1 atm pressure.
- Release the clamp to separate the diving bell from the chamber system.
The first two steps were completed when Crammond mistakenly opened the clamp holding the hatch before Hellevik (diver 4) closed the chamber. This resulted in the chamber being immediately decompressed from 9 atm to the surrounding 1 atm pressure. Air rushed out of the chamber system with tremendous force, jamming the hatch door inside and pushing the diving bell far away, smashing into two tender heads. All four divers perished; one of the tenders, Crammond, died, while Saunders was critically injured.
IV. Medical Findings
Medical investigations conducted on the remains of the four divers revealed significant findings. Notably, there was a large amount of fat present in arteries, large veins, and the heart chamber, as well as endothelial fat in organs, especially the liver. This fat was not capable of causing a blockage but certainly precipitated from the blood at the site. Autopsies showed that bubble formation in the blood had altered lipoprotein complexes, rendering lipids insoluble. These fats, now insoluble, could be the reason for their circulation stoppage.
Coward, Lucas, and Bergersen were affected by the decompression explosion and died at the positions indicated in the diagram. The forensic investigation by pathologists determined that Hellevik, due to experiencing the highest pressure and being in the process of securing the inner door, was forced to squeeze through a 60 cm (24 in) long chisel-shaped gap created by the jammed hatch door inside. With air and pressure escaping, it involved the shearing of his chest cavity, leading to fragmentation of his body, followed by the expulsion of all thoracic and abdominal visceral organs, except the trachea and a part of the small intestine, and of the thoracic spine. They were projected at some distance, some found as high as 10 meters (30 ft) vertically above the outer pressure door.
Investigation
The Byford Dolphin Accident Footage investigation committee concluded that human error by the diver tender who opened the clamp was the cause. The hatch door was designed with a central hinge, similar to a butterfly valve disc, and it swung too far to the left, causing the inside hatch lip to jam into the door opening. This left a chisel-shaped gap, similar to an open manhole cover but held fixed. This created a hole with a diameter of 24 inches (61 cm). It’s unclear whether the tender opened the clamp before the hatch door was depressurized due to a supervisor’s order, their own initiative, or a misunderstanding. At that time, the only communication the tenders outside the chamber system had was through a wall-mounted loudspeaker; with the loud noise from the drilling rig and the sea, it was challenging to hear what was happening. Fatigue after long hours of hard work also affected the divers, who typically worked 16-hour shifts.
This Byford Dolphin Accident Footage was also deemed a technical failure. The Byford Dolphin diving system, outdated since 1975, lacked safety hatch doors, external pressure gauges, and interlocking mechanisms, which could have prevented the hatch from opening when the chamber system was under pressure. Before the accident, Norske Veritas issued certification regulations: “The connecting structures between the bell and the chamber must be arranged so that they cannot be operated when the trunk is under pressure,” thus requiring those systems to have unsafe seals and interlocking mechanisms. A month after the accident, Norske Veritas and the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate issued final regulations for all bell systems.
Among others, former crew members of Byford Dolphin and NOPEF (a Norwegian oil and petrochemical workers’ union) came forward, claiming the investigation was a cover-up. They alleged that the accident investigation committee failed to address in their report the allocation of responsibility for critical equipment as required by Comex and delegated by the authorized diving department to the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, a key agency in the accident. They also accused the accident of being due to the lack of proper equipment, including clamping mechanisms equipped with interlocking mechanisms (unable to open when the chamber system is under pressure), external pressure gauges, and safe communication systems, all of which had been delayed due to allocation by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate.
Lawsuit
The North Sea Divers Alliance, established by the first divers in the North Sea and relatives of the deceased, continued to push for further investigation. In February 2008, they received a report showing that the actual cause was equipment failure. Clare Lucas, daughter of Roy Lucas, said: “I can go as far as to say that the Norwegian government murdered my father because they knew they were diving in an unsafe decompression chamber.” The families of the last divers eventually received compensation from the Norwegian government, 26 years after the incident.